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An implicit assumption underpins basic models of the evolution of cooperation, mutualism and altruism: The benefits (or pay-
offs) of cooperation and defection are defined by the current frequency or distribution of cooperators. In social dilemmas
involving durable public goods (group resources that can persist in the environment–ubiquitous from microbes to humans)
this assumption is violated. Here, we examine the consequences of relaxing this assumption, allowing pay-offs to depend on
both current and past numbers of cooperators. We explicitly trace the dynamic of a public good created by cooperators, and
define pay-offs in terms of the current public good. By raising the importance of cooperative history in determining the current
fate of cooperators, durable public goods cause novel dynamics (e.g., transient increases in cooperation in Prisoner’s
Dilemmas, oscillations in Snowdrift Games, or shifts in invasion thresholds in Stag-hunt Games), while changes in durability
can transform one game into another, by moving invasion thresholds for cooperation or conditions for coexistence with
defectors. This enlarged view challenges our understanding of social cheats. For instance, groups of cooperators can do worse
than groups of defectors, if they inherit fewer public goods, while a rise in defectors no longer entails a loss of social benefits,
at least not in the present moment (as highlighted by concerns over environmental lags). Wherever durable public goods have
yet to reach a steady state (for instance due to external perturbations), the history of cooperation will define the ongoing
dynamics of cooperators.
Citation: Brown SP, Taddei F (2007) The Durability of Public Goods Changes the Dynamics and Nature of Social Dilemmas. PLoS ONE 2(7): e593.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000593
INTRODUCTION
Social dilemmas
Cooperative or altruistic behaviours have long puzzled biologists
[1–14]: Given the presence of defectors or cheats, how can more
cooperative behaviours persist? The simplest and most common
models of cooperation present two interacting players with a simple
and symmetric choice, to cooperate or to defect [4]. If they both
cooperate, they each receive a reward, R, which is larger than the
punishment, P, obtained if they both defect. If one defects while
the other cooperates, the defector receives the ‘temptation’ payoff,
T, and the cooperator receives the sucker’s payoff S (methods).
This terminology was introduced for the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
which is defined by the ranking T.R.P.S. Given the relative
magnitude of the payoff values, a rational player should always
defect in one-off encounters, regardless of whether the other player
cooperates or not. Thus the problematic outcome is total
defection, despite a higher pay-off occurring when everyone
cooperates. (maintenance of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma requires additional mechanisms that ensure cooperators
are more likely to encounter other cooperators than expected by
chance [5]).
The Prisoner’s Dilemma represents the strictest form of a social
dilemma, however other payoff rankings in the 2-player game are
consistent with a social dilemma [10,15]. The Snowdrift Game
(related to the Chicken or Hawk-Dove Game [7,10,16]) is defined
by the payoff ranking T.R.S.P. Thus if the opponent
cooperates, it is best to defect (T.R). Yet if the opponent defects,
it is best to cooperate (S.P). The premium on following a distinct
strategy is illustrative of negative frequency-dependent selection,
ensuring coexistence between cooperators and defectors in a well-
mixed population. The Stag-hunt Game (an example of a co-
ordination game [10]) is defined by the payoff ranking
R.T.P.S. The Stag-hunt Game places a premium on co-
ordinated responses, thus if your partner cooperates, it is best to
cooperate (R.T), yet if your partner defects, it is best to defect
(P.S). The premium on coordinated responses is illustrative of
positive frequency-dependent selection, ensuring bistability in
a well-mixed population (a final outcome of either cooperators-
only or defectors-only, dependent on initial frequency of
cooperators).
Public goods
In addition to the study of two-player games akin to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, ecological and economic social dilemmas are often
couched in the language of public goods (or related notions such as
common pool resources or the tragedy of the commons). In
contrast to the cooperator games presented above, public goods
dilemmas focus attention on an openly accessible ‘good’ or
resource that is potentially impacted by the actions of individuals
[17–20]. Human examples include air quality, scientific discovery
or national defence [17–20]; microbial examples include side-
rophores, colicins, signal molecules, extracellular enzymes and
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in particular the lack of excludability from the benefits of the
public good ensure that defectors that exploit the public good but
make no efforts to generate or conserve it, can prosper.
Whereas the discussion of public goods commonly invokes
material resources such as those listed above, theoretical and
experimental approaches to the study of public goods effectively
replace the public good with a focus on the underlying behaviour
of cooperators and defectors [10,11,28]. By focusing on the
frequency of cooperators, this approach makes the implicit
assumption that the public good is entirely defined by the current
frequency of cooperators, essentially allowing the ‘public good’
itself to drop out of the analysis, in favour of a study of cooperation
versus defection analogous to the two-player models presented
above. The ‘cooperation equals public good’ paradigm has been
strikingly successful in generating a diversity of approaches to
modeling social dilemmas ([1–14]; kin selection, group selection,
reciprocal altruism, etc).
Here we examine what are the consequences for relaxing the
linkage between cooperators and public goods. Details of our
modelling approach are presented in the methods section,
however the spirit of approach is simple–whereas classic game-
theoretic models of cooperation focus solely on the frequency of
cooperators p (defining public goods implicitly as p), we add
a second variable e, explicitly tracking the amount of public goods.
The addition of an explicit public goods variable allows for diverse
novel outcomes, for instance transient increases in cooperation in
Prisoner’s Dilemmas, shifts in invasion thresholds in Stag-hunt
Games, and multi-generational oscillations between cooperators
and their enduring public goods in Snowdrift Games.
RESULTS
If we normalise the payoffs for mutual cooperation R and mutual
defection P to 1 and 0 respectively, social dilemmas can be
described in game theoretic terms by two key parameters, the
‘temptation’ to cheat, T, and the ‘sucker’ reward for unilateral
cooperation, S [10,29] (Fig. 1a, methods). Traditional game-
theoretic analyses focus on the frequency of cooperators, p through
time, as a function of S and T. We extend this traditional one-
dimensional treatment [10,11,29] (methods) with an explicit
public-goods equation, tracking the dynamics of the public good
e (0#e,‘), created by cooperators at a production rate c, and lost
at a decay rate u (incorporating both intrinsic rates of decay and
extrinsic rates of removal or dilution),
dp=dt~p(1 p)(Sz(1 T S)e)
de=dt~cp ue
ð1Þ
The pay-offs to cooperators and defectors are now defined by
the current intensity of the public good e (methods, Fig. 1), which is
in turn produced by cooperators. The explicit representation of
public good as distinct from cooperators introduces an element of
memory into the system, large c and u (relative to the magnitude of
payoffs, T and S) implies a fast rate of production and decay of the
public good, ensuring p and e are in close agreement; in this case
the history of past cooperation is of little importance. In contrast,
when c and u are small, the public good changes only slowly in
response to time and current frequency of cooperators, and reflects
more strongly the past contributions to the public good. Initially
we focus on the special case where c=u=x, and look at the affects
of varying the general lag parameter, x.
Coexistence: Snowdrift Game
In agreement with the traditional one-dimensional model
(methods), when c=u=x the equilibrium analysis with snowdrift
parameters (T.1, S.0, Fig 1a,c) predicts a stable coexistence of
cooperators and defectors at p*=e*=S/(S+T-1). However, in
contrast to the traditional model, the approach towards the
coexistence point p* will follow damped oscillations if x is
sufficiently small (x,4S(T-1)/(S+T-1), methods, Fig 2). Decreasing
x beyond the threshold value acts to strengthen and lengthen the
oscillations, allowing both cooperators and defectors to effectively
fixate for long periods of time. In Fig. 2b we see that given an
initial absence of public good, and despite a predicted 50/50
coexistence point, for the first 250 arbitary time units (potentially
many generations), either cooperators or defectors are in near
complete domination, irrespective of the starting frequency of
cooperators. In Fig. 2c, public good is mapped against cooperator
frequency in a phase-plane plot, for differing levels of x
(summarising Figs 2a,b).
Bistability: Stag-hunt Game
Turning to the Stag-hunt Game (T,1, S,0, Fig. 1a,d), equilib-
rium analysis predicts bistability (pure cooperation or pure
defection at equilibrium) with the watershed or separatrix when
c=u=x passing through the unstable equilibrium at p*=e*=S/
(S+T-1). In Fig. 3 we illustrate the temporal dynamics of p and e
given that the public good is initially absent (e0=0), for both high
and low values of x
When equilibration is fast (x is large relative to the magnitude of
S and T, fig 3a), we see behaviour close to that predicted from the
traditional one-dimensional model, irrespective of the initial public
good status, e0. However, as x decreases, and the public good
becomes more durable (and slower to produce), we find that the
initial condition e0 has an increasing role in determining the
threshold to producer dominance in a Stag-hunt Game. Thus in
Fig 3b, we see that despite a predicted threshold at p*=0.5, we
find that even when cooperators are initially numerically dominant
(p0=0.9), defectors go to fixation when e0=0.
In Fig. 3c, the dependence on initial conditions of both p and e is
illustrated for varying levels of x in a phase-plane plot. When x is
large, p and e are intimately tied together, so p is a good predictor
of e and hence of whether cooperators or defectors go to fixation,
in keeping with the implicit assumption of the traditional model. In
contrast, as x drops, p and e can become dissociated (with e being
increasingly weighted in favour of past cooperation), so that the
current frequency of cooperators p is no longer a good predictor of
the current strength of the public good e, hence it becomes
essential to explicitly measure e in order to predict the fitness and
fate of cooperators and defectors. Thus for example in Fig. 3c we
see that when x=0.01, defectors will go to fixation regardless of
their current frequency if e,0.2, and similarly cooperators will go
to fixation regardless of their current frequency if e.0.8.
Generally, when the lag effect is strong (x is small), the history of
cooperation becomes central. In the context of invasion biology,
the Stag-hunt analysis illustrates the importance of considering
whether invaders bring their public goods with them (e.g.
microbial supernatent or plant soil).
Prisoner’s dilemma
Turning to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (T.1, S,0 Figs 1a,b,d), we
find the same conclusion as for the traditional model, ie
cooperators are doomed to extinction (sole stable equilibrium is
p*=0, e*=0). However, when selection against cooperators is
weaker for increasing values of the public good (T+S,1, red line,
Dilemmas & Cooperative History
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transiently exclude defectors if e is sufficiently large (black lines,
Fig. 4). Nonetheless, pure cooperation remains unstable as the
total production of cooperators when p=1 is insufficient to
maintain the public good in sufficient excess. Eventually (with time
dependent on x) e will decline below S/(S+T-1), and then
cooperators will inevitably be sent to extinction in the absence of
further external perturbations (Fig. 4).
Changing the game
The nature of a game (whether a Snowdrift Game or a Stag-hunt
Game, etc) will be sensitive to the ecology underlying the game
parameters (in our framework, T, S, c and u). We can now ask what
is the affect of a perturbation in the durability parameter u, relative
to a reference game (pre-perturbation), defined by e*(p=1)=c/u=1
(methods). Changes to the decay of public goods u relative to their
production c (i.e. movement away from u=c) can change the
Figure 1. Social dilemmas and payoffs to cooperators and defectors. a, Common social dilemmas organized on the ‘sucker’, ‘temptation’ (S, T)
plane (R and P normalised to 1 and 0; see text for details). b–d, expected relative payoff of cooperators as a function of public goods e is fc-fd=S+e(1-
T-S), for 0#e,‘. Cooperator and defector payoffs are equal on the dashed lines (fc=fd). b, Dominance games. Red line, Prisoner’s Dilemma, S=20.5,
T=1.6. Blue line, cooperator dominance, S=0.3, T=0.4. c, Coexistence games. Red line, Snowdrift Game, S=0.5, T=1.5. Blue line, cooperator
dominance, S=0.5, T=0.9 (but becomes snowdrift if u/c decreases sufficiently to allow e*p=1.S/(S+T-1), here if u/c,4/5). d, Bistability games. Blue
line, Stag-hunt Game, S=20.5, T=0.5. Red line, Prisoner’s Dilemma, S=20.5, T=1.1 (but becomes Stag-hunt if u/c decreases sufficiently to allow
e*p=1.S/(S+T-1), here if u/c,4/5). Unless otherwise stated, game identities are consistent with u=c. See methods for more details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000593.g001
Figure 2. Impact of durability on Snowdrift (coexistence) game dynamics. Snowdrift game (T=1.5, S=0.5, c=u=x), stable coexistence of
cooperators and defectors at p*=e*=S/(S+T-1)=0.5, threshold to oscillations x,1 (see methods). a, b Temporal dynamics of cooperators p (black)
and public good e (grey). Initial values of p range from 0.1 to 0.9. Initial value of e is zero. a, x=10. b, x=0.01. c public good (e)–cooperator (p) phase
plane. Lines illustrate simulated trajectories for differing values of x (10, 0.1, 0.01) from initial position p0=e0=0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000593.g002
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value of public goods away from 1 (e*p=1=1 when u=c, Fig. 1).
For instance, increasing the decay rate u in a Stag-hunt Game
(blue line Fig 1d) reduces e*p=1 below one, to the limit (u=c(S+T-
1)/S) where defection becomes dominating and a Prisoner’s
Dilemma is recovered. Reversing this logic, certain Prisoner’s
Dilemmas (red line, Fig. 1d) can become Stag-hunts with locally-
stable cooperation simply due to an increased durability of the
public good (when u,c(S+T-1)/S) and therefore a higher stable
equilibrium value of public good e*p=1.1, irrespective of the
productivity c of cooperators. Just as changing the production-
decay ratio c/u can cause shifts between bistability and defector
domination, changing this ratio can also cause shifts between
coexistence (Snowdrift Games) and cooperator domination
(Fig. 1c). Increasing the decay rate of public good u (depressing
e*p=1 below one) in a Snowdrift Game (red line, Fig 1c) can lead to
the exclusion of defectors, as defectors have insufficient equilib-
rium public goods e*p=1 to exploit, and so cannot invade. In
addition to changing the equilibrium behaviour of games, altering
the c/u ratio can also modify game dynamics (methods,
supplementary materials).
Finally, we note that ‘public bads’ such as pollution, government
debt, etc are of course social dilemmas and can be viewed
explicitly as the negative space of e in our existing models. If we
now return to Fig 1b (which has no game changes in positive space
of e), and extrapolate into the negative space of e we see that the
blue line (cooperator dominance) has a ‘hidden staghunt’ for
sufficiently low e (i.e. if the environment is really bad (e,S/(S+T-
1)), then best to keep on defecting to oblivion), whereas in contrast
we find a ‘hidden snowdrift’ for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in
Fig 1b (i.e. if the environment is really bad, then best to start
cooperating until e returns to moderate negative at e=S/(S+T-1).
DISCUSSION
Building on the simplest models of social dilemmas, we have
moved from a world consisting only of cooperators and defectors,
to a world of cooperators, defectors and their environmental
consequences. We present models where the payoffs depend on
the state of a public good, that in turn depends on both current
and past levels of cooperation. Such an approach is likely to be
particularly important in any situation where cooperators and
public good are out of steady state equilibrium with each other, as
for instance when either genetic or technological innovations or
environmental or political perturbations (storms, war) at least
transiently displace any equilibrium leading to continued change
in both cooperators and public goods. For some examples of
cooperation, for instance anti-predator vigilance, the act of
cooperating is at least at first sight inseparable from the ensuing
rewards. However, there are many more examples of cooperative
behaviour where there is a clear separation between the
cooperative act and the subsequent generation of reward, with
physical intermediates ranging from extracellular microbial
enzymes to ant nests to bridges to scientific papers [17–27]. By
highlighting the capacity for social organisms and their environ-
ments to engage in feedback loops, our findings tie social dilemmas
into niche construction fields [30–32]. We show here that
increasing the lag (reducing x) between changes in cooperator
and public good densities can lead to diverse novel outcomes, for
instance multi-generation oscillations between cooperators and
their enduring public goods in Snowdrift Games (Fig 2), shifts in
invasion thresholds and resulting equilibria in Stag-hunt games
(Fig 3) and transient increases in cooperation in Prisoner’s
Dilemmas (Fig 4).
Figure 3. Impact of durability on Stag-hunt (bistable) game dynamics. Staghunt game (T=0.5, S=20.5, c=u=x), repellor at p*=e*=S/(S+T-
1)=0.5. a,b Temporal dynamics of cooperator p (black) and public good e (grey). Initial values of p range from 0.1 to 0.9. Initial value of e is zero. a,
x=10. b, x=0.1. c public good (e)–cooperator (p) phase plane. Lines illustrate simulated separatrices demarcating the basins of attraction for pure
cooperator and pure defector equilibria (closed circles). Unstable equilibrium (open circle) at p*=e*=S/(S+T-1)=0.5. Lines represent differing values
of x (10, 1, 0.1, 0.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000593.g003
Figure 4. Prisoner’s dilemma (defector dominance) game dynamics
given durable public goods. Public good (e)–cooperator (p) phase
plane. T=1.1, S=20.5, c=u=x=0.1. Sole stable equilibrium, p*=e*=0.
Lines illustrate simulated trajectories for differing initial values of e (0.2
to 1.2 in red; 1.3 to 1.9 in black) for initial p=0.5
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000593.g004
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well-studied baseline for a generic treatment of social dilemmas.
However, our generic treatment leaves many more dimensions to
be addressed–for instance the effects of more complex public
goods dynamics, population structure, demography, strength of
selection, stochasticity, finite populations, and so on. The
dynamics of durable public goods are potentially more diverse
than our current model allows, for instance characterized by
different patterns of production and degradation as a function of
their interactions with cooperators (producers or protectors of
a public good) and defectors (non-producers or exploiters of
a public good). In more complex scenarios, the public goods (or
‘public bads’ such as pollution or public debt) themselves are
subject to independent dynamics due to extrinsic environmental
forces (periodic and/or stochastic perturbations), or even to self-
replication, making an intriguing bridge between durable public
goods and symbionts–both ‘good’ (e.g. crops, livestock) and ‘bad’
(e.g. parasites) (see also [34]). A number of intriguing consequences
of playing durable public goods games in a spatially-explicit setting
are plausible. Whereas classic approaches to spatially-extended
cooperative games have focused on the role of aggregation in
cooperators [7,9], a spatially-extended durable public goods game
would focus equally on the role of aggregation in public goods, and
would track the degree of concordance between aggregates of
cooperators and of public goods to ask in general what conditions
would favour aggregations (‘cities’) of public goods? And how
resistant are these ‘cities’ against invasion by defectors?
In the absence of any of these potential complications, our
generic two state variable model of social dilemmas highlights that
dissociating the dynamics of cooperators and public goods has
suprising consequences, for instance groups of cooperators can do
worse than groups of defectors, if the defectors inherit superior
public goods. This notion in turn changes the meaning of defectors
or social cheats. In this enlarged view, it is no longer the case that
a rise in defectors entails a loss of social benefits–at least not in the
present moment (as highlighted by many environmentalist
concerns). At best, given sufficiently long-lived public goods,
a defector may be a social ‘cheat’ with regards to future
generations, having no immediate impact on its social group.
Thus an early cheat in a dominant cooperative phase in Fig. 2b
has little immediate impact on the rising public good, yet their
more numerous strategic descendents can lead to its fall. The
recognition that durable public goods are ubiquitous and violate
an implicit assumption underpinning all basic models of the
evolution of cooperation implies that our work will have diverse
consequences across the fields of evolutionary biology, molecular
biology, ecology, economics, and political science, and be of
practical relevance across many levels of biology, from bio-
technology and medicine (concerned with microbial public goods)
to the maintenance of environmental services.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Payoffs for cooperation C and defection D in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
(and related games) can be expressed in matrix form as follows
CD
C RS
D TP
Payoffs are illustrated for the row player, dependent on the
strategy of their partner (column player) and themselves. A
necessary condition for a social dilemma is that the reward for
mutual cooperation is greater than the reward for mutual
defection (i.e. R.P). Assuming R.P and normalising to R=1
and P=0, we can reduce the parameter set to T and S [10,29], ie
the payoff matrix becomes
CD
C 1 S
DT0
Given this matrix, the expected payoffs for cooperators and
defectors as a function of the proportion of cooperators p can be
simply derived under the assumption of random mixing, ie the
probability of interacting with a cooperator is p and the probability
of interacting with a defector is 1-p, regardless of a focal
individual’s strategy. Under the assumption of random mixing,
the expected payoffs for cooperators and defectors are fc=p+(1-p)S
and fd=pT respectively, for 0#p#1.
By relating expected payoffs with fitness, the dynamics of
cooperators and defectors in a large well-mixed population can
now be described by the replicator equation dp/dt=p(fc–f), where f is
the mean payoff, f=pf c+(1-p)fd (for further details on replicator
dynamics and derivation of the replicator equation, see [29,33]). The
replicator equation for 2-player games can now be simplified to
dp=dt~p(1 p)(Sz(1 T S)p)
The system has three potential equilibria; pure cooperators
(p*=1), pure defectors (p*=0) and mixed cooperators and
defectors (p*=S/(S+T-1)). When T.1 and S,0 (Prisoner’s
dilemma) only pure defection is stable. When T.1 and S.0
(Snowdrift Game), only the mixed equilibrium is stable, the system
tends towards coexistence at p*=S/(S+T-1). In contrast, when
T,1 and S,0 (Stag-hunt Game), only the pure equilibria are
stable, ie the system is bistable, with p*=S/(S+T-1) serving as
a repellor, separating the basins of attraction for pure cooperation
and pure defection.
Durable public goods
In the above classic framework, the expected payoffs for
cooperators and defectors, namely fc and fd,a r es i m p l ea n d
direct functions of the current frequency of cooperators, p.W e
now wish to challenge this framework by assuming that payoffs
are directly determined by the extent of a shared public good, e,
which in turn depends on frequency of cooperators both past
and present. We begin by normalizing e so that when
cooperators (producers of a public good) are fixed in a population
for a sufficient period of time to allow the public good e to go to
equilibrium, this equilibrium is set to one (e*p=1=1). Likewise,
when defectors go to fixation, the public good at equilibrium is
s e tt oz e r o( e*p=0=0). Considering that T describes the initial
payoff of a lone defector in a population of pure cooperators,
and conversely, that S describes the initial payoff of a lone
cooperator in a population of pure defectors, we can define the
following payoffs as a function of e
e~1 e~0
C 1 S
DT 0
Dilemmas & Cooperative History
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the rewarding element (now e instead of p), we can now extrapolate
between the e=1 and e=0 payoffs, and express expected payoffs
as a direct function of the public good, i.e. fc=e+(1-e)S and fd=eT,
for 0#e,‘. These payoff functions are clearly analogous to the
classic functions fc=p+(1-p)S and fd=pT, and are identical under
the classic assumption that the public good is determined by the
current frequency of cooperators, ie e=p. Given these expected
payoffs, the dynamics of cooperators and defectors in a large well-
mixed population (random encounters) can again be described by
the replicator equation [10,33], which now becomes dp/dt=p (fc–
f)=p(1-p)( S+(1-T-S)e). To this point, we have specified how public
goods e influence the dynamics of cooperators, but not the reverse.
In order to complete the feedback loop between cooperators p and
public goods e, we consider that cooperators produce public goods
at a rate c, while public goods decay or are lost at rate u, specifying
de/dt=cp–ue, and returning us to model (1). Note that our
specification that when cooperators dominate (p=1), the equilib-
rium level of public good is normalised to one (ie e*(p=1)=c/u=1),
entails c and u are expressed in units ensuring c=u.
Next we outline the stability conditions for the three fixed points of
model (1). When c=u, the conclusions of the stability analysis
described above for the one-dimensional model holds for the two-
dimensional model. Generalising for any positive combination of c
and u, the stability conditions for the three fixed points are as follows.
Pure defection (p*=e*=0) is locally stable if S,0. Pure cooperation
(p*=1, e*=c/u) is locally stable if T,1+S(u-c)/c.F i n a l l y ,m i x e d
cooperators and defectors (p*=Su/c(S+T-1), e*=S/(S+T-1)) is stable
if S.0, T.1+S(u-c)/c and S/(S+T-1),u/c. The approach to this
equilibrium (when stable) will follow damped oscillations when the
decay of the public good is sufficiently small, namely if u,4cS(S+T-
1)/[c(S+T-1)+4S
2]. Under the constraint c=u=x, the condition for
oscillations reduces to x,4S(T-1)/(S+T-1).
For any public good e, governed by parameters S, T, u and c,w e
have defined the scale of e so that when cooperators dominate (p=1),
the equilibrium level of public good equals one (ie e*(p=1)=c/u=1).
But what if the relative strength of the parameters governing the
production and decay of the public good (c and u)w e r et o
subsequently change? We can now ask what is the affect of
a perturbation in the durability parameter u, relative to a reference
game (pre-perturbation), defined by e*(p=1)=c/u=1. In the
Snowdrift Game, decreasing the removal rate u (for constant c)h a s
the expected consequence of reducing the equilibrium share of
producers, as defectors are able to more effectively parasitize the
durable public good (Fig. S1). Furthermore, we see that reducing u
also has the effect of introducing oscillations (if u,4cS(S+T-1)/
[c(S+T-1)+4S
2]) that become increasingly severe as the public good
becomes long lasting. In the Stag-hunt Game, if we vary u
independently of c,w es e et h a td e c r e a s i n gu linearly reduces the
repelling equilibrium point (Fig S2), potentially enlarging the basin of
attraction for the pure cooperation equilibrium (cooperation has the
highest payoff in the context of high levels of the public good, e).
However, the extent to which the threshold to cooperator invasion is
lowered depends on the history of cooperation, represented by the
current value of the public good e.W h e ne is absent (bottom of Fig
S2), the threshold to cooperator invasion is raised, and altering the
decay rate of the public good has only a minimal impact on the
threshold position.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Figure S1
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000593.s001 (0.04 MB
PDF)
Figure S2
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000593.s002 (0.05 MB
PDF)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Jim Bull, Mike Cant, Andy Gardner, Christoph Hauert, Lauren
Meyers, Sean Rands, Erik Voltz and the members of the Paris
Interdisciplinary College for invaluable discussions and comments on
earlier versions of this manuscript. We thank the Human Frontier Science
Program (S.P.B.) and EURYI (F.T.) for financial support.
Author Contributions
Conceived the project and wrote the paper: SPB FT. Performed the model
development and analysis: SPB. SB.
REFERENCES
1. Hamilton WD (1964) The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I. J Theor Biol
7: 1–16.
2. Trivers RL (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q Rev Biol 46: 35–57.
3. Wilson DS (1975) A theory of group selection. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 72:
143–146.
4. Axelrod R (1984) The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
5. Frank SA (1998) The foundations of Social Evolution. Princeton: Priceton
University Press.
6. Sachs JL, Mueller UG, Wilcox TP, Bull JJ (2004) The evolution of cooperation.
Q Rev Biol 79: 135–160.
7. Hauert C, Doebeli M (2005) Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game. Ecol Lett 8: 748–766.
8. Lehmann L, Keller L (2006) The evolution of cooperation and altruism-a general
framework and a classification of models. J Evol Biol 19: 1365–1376.
9. Nowak MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314:
1560–1563.
10. Hauert C, Michor F, Nowak MA, Doebeli M (2006) Synergy and discounting of
cooperation in social dilemmas. J Theor Biol 239: 195–202.
11. Hauert C, Holmes M, Doebeli M (2006) Evolutionary games and population
dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games. Proc R Soc B
273: 2565–2570.
12. Foster KR, Wenseleers T (2006) A general model for the evolution of
mutualisms. J Evol Biol 19: 1283–1293.
13. Jansen VAA, van Baalen M (2006) Altruism through beard chromodynamics.
Nature 440: 663–666.
14. West SA, Griffin AS, Gardner A (2007) Social semantics: altruism, cooperation,
mutualism, strong reciprocity and group selection. J Evol Biol 20: 415–432.
15. Rapoport A, Geyer M, Gordon D (1976) The 262 Game. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
16. Maynard-Smith J, Price GR (1973) The logic of animal conflict. Nature 246:
15–18.
17. Olson M (1965) The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of
groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
18. Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243–1248.
19. Ostrom E (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
20. Dionisio F, Gordo I (2006) The tragedy of the commons, the public goods
dilemma, and the meaning of rivalry and excludability in evolutionary biology.
Evol Ecol Res 8: 321–332.
21. Crespi BJ (2001) The evolution of social behavior in microorganisms. Trends
Ecol Evol 16: 178–183.
22. Brown SP, Johnstone RA (2001) Cooperation in the dark: signaling and
collective action in quorum-sensing bacteria. Proc R Soc B 268: 961–965.
23. Brown SP, Hochberg ME, Grenfell BT (2002) Does multiple infection select for
raised virulence? Trends Microbiol 10: 401–405.
24. Rainey PB, Rainey K (2003) Evolution of cooperation and conflict in
experimental bacterial populations. Nature 425: 72–74.
25. Grieg D, Travisano M (2004) The Prisoner’s Dilemma and polymorphism in
yeast SUC genes. Proc R Soc B 271: S25–S26.
26. Dugatkin LA, Perlin M, Lucas JS, Atlas R (2005) Group-beneficial traits,
frequency-dependent selection and genotypic diversity: an antibiotic resistance
paradigm. Proc R Soc B 272: 79–83.
27. West SA, Griffin AS, Gardner A, Diggle SP (2006) Social evolution theory for
microorganisms Nature Rev Microbiol 4: 597–607.
Dilemmas & Cooperative History
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 July 2007 | Issue 7 | e59328. Fehr E, Ga ¨chter S (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415: 137–140.
29. Hofbauer J, Sigmund K (1998) Evolutionary games and population dynamics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
30. Odling-Smee FJ, Laland KN, Feldma MW (2003) Niche Construction: the
neglected process in evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
31. Jones CG, Lawton JH, Shachak M (1994) Organisms as ecosystem engineers.
Oikos 69: 373–386.
32. Gardner A, West SA (2004) Cooperation and punishment, especially in humans.
American Naturalist 164: 753–764.
33. Nowak MA (2006) Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
34. Brown SP, Le Chat L, De Paepe M, Taddei F (2006) Ecology of microbial
invasions: amplification allows virus carriers to invade more rapidly when rare.
Current Biology 16: 2048–2052.
Dilemmas & Cooperative History
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 July 2007 | Issue 7 | e593